


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**DIRECTORATE OF  
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completed

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Communist China: The Open Door Policy*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
25 November 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist China: The Open Door Policy

Introduction

Viewed from almost any perspective, the sequence of events that began with Canada's recognition of Peking in mid-October and ended with last week's vote on the China representation issue in the UN seems likely to prove a watershed in the development of Communist China's relations with the world at large. The successful conclusion of the long-drawn-out negotiations in Stockholm was at once symbolic of a general trend and itself a powerful impetus toward further intensification of that trend. For unlike French recognition of Peking in 1964, Ottawa's recent move was clearly not an isolated act. Other states are already lining up at Peking's door. And that door now seems open, or at least ajar. Moreover, Canadian recognition of Peking, followed by that of Italy, almost certainly played a role in garnering for Communist China a plurality in the UN General Assembly in favor of the traditional "Albanian" resolution calling for the admission of the mainland regime and the expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese from the world body. Clearly Peking's formal position in the community of nations is undergoing a change. It is less clear, however, to what degree this formal change will be translated into real and fundamental changes in Communist China's foreign relationships or, indeed, to what extent these formal changes are the result of significant modifications that may have already occurred in Peking's foreign policy and to what extent the changes themselves are likely to induce modifications in the future.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.

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"Chirep" and "Chirec"

1. Movement on the recognition issue alone is now occurring at a rate that would have seemed scarcely believable as recently as two years ago. Rome has followed Ottawa in concluding its extended negotiations on the question, and Italian diplomats indicated that the Canadian move made a rapid wind-up of the talks imperative. Austria has announced that it too expects to enter into negotiations leading to recognition, and the Belgian Government, which has toyed with the idea for some time, is obviously inclined to follow suit in short order. Luxembourg has indicated that it does not intend to be relegated to the end of the queue and will probably follow Belgium into talks with Peking. Although Belgium has some bilateral problems with mainland China, none of these nations has expressed any reservations concerning the recognition formula worked out with Ottawa, and as a result this series of talks, when they occur, should be relatively brief. In that case Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Ireland, and West Germany would be the only nations in Europe lacking formal diplomatic ties with Peking; of these West Germany is an important trading partner of Communist China.

2. In Africa, Equatorial Guinea's recognition of the mainland regime followed hard on the heels of that of Canada. Ethiopian probes on the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations have received a positive response from Peking, and negotiations should begin soon. It is hard to see how Libyan Premier Qaddafi, with his aspirations to play a major role among "progressive" Arab states, can expect to maintain relations with Taipei very much longer. Several other African states are likely to continue to recognize the Nationalist Chinese only if they are handsomely subsidized by Taiwan--and this must be balanced by the possibility that France may suggest to some of its former colonies that they move in the direction of Peking. In Latin America, Chilean President Allende has already announced that he plans to recognize Peking; when this occurs Peru

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and probably Bolivia might find it difficult not to follow suit. Should either or both recognize Communist China, still other South American countries could find themselves under pressure to move in the same direction. This list is by no means exclusive. In Lebanon the recognition question has again become a "hot" one in domestic politics; Mexico and perhaps some Caribbean states appear to be rethinking their China policy; [redacted]

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[redacted] In short, the recognition snowball is rolling and may still be gaining momentum.

3. In the United Nations a similar situation prevails. The Important Question Resolution, requiring a two-thirds majority on the China representation was passed again this year, thus precluding an immediate substitution of Peking for Taipei in the world body. But the vote on this resolution was 66-52--down from last year's 71-48--and even this result was achieved only because a number of nations had made an early commitment to vote "yes." Several states are likely to be most reluctant to repeat this vote next year, since it appears to "frustrate the will of the majority"; some have already indicated that they expect to change their position. In fact, the usefulness of the Important Question tactic is probably at an end. Moreover, as a result of the vote in favor of the Albanian resolution, psychological pressure for the admission of Communist China is almost certain to increase perceptibly in coming months. In fact, there is in New York virtually a universal feeling--shared by the US mission at the UN--that this is the last year that the present situation can be maintained.

#### The Warming Trend

4. Moreover, the issue of China's "place in the world" is not confined simply to the twin questions of "chirec" and "chirep," as the cable shorthand would have it. The bare announcement that Chou En-lai planned to visit Southern Yemen--at an unspecified date--led to the extraordinary spectacle

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earlier this autumn of a covey of nations in Europe and Africa all but lining up hat in hand in the hope that Chou would include their capitals in his itinerary. Nor is this all. A wide array of states, most of which, while maintaining formal relations with Peking, have been to a greater or lesser degree estranged from Communist China in recent years, are now in the process of patching things up or cementing ties with the mainland regime. Relations with Hanoi, which had improved since the dark days after the start of the Paris talks, have clearly grown closer in the past six or seven months; those with Pyongyang, which certainly were very bad, have warmed remarkably in the past year. In Eastern Europe a parallel movement has taken place. All governments in the region except Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have now received Chinese ambassadors after the hiatus of the Cultural Revolution, a steady stream of visitors from Romania continues to travel to Peking, and--most remarkably--Yugoslavia, long engaged in a violent slanging match with China, has not only exchanged ambassadors but is actively embarked on an effort to gain Peking the Chinese seat in the UN.

5. But the warming trend is not confined to socialist states. High-level delegations from Arab states--notably Sudan, Libya, and Southern Yemen--were so numerous in Peking last August that they were all but tripping over each other. Zambia, a terminus of the Chinese-engineered Tan Zam railroad, has improved its ties with Peking; Tanzania at the other end of the rail line, now relies exclusively on Chinese military advisers. France has dispatched two emissaries, one official and one unofficial, to Peking in the past few months, and President Pompidou is clearly exploring the possibilities of an active Far Eastern policy based on friendship with Communist China. Britain is repairing relations at a more cautious pace. A high-level foreign office official has just completed a visit to Peking--the first at this level in many years--and while no real breakthrough resulted, London did explore the possibility

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of mutually raising the level of diplomatic representation between the two countries to ambassadorial level. In addition, the Pope is planning a visit in early December to Hong Kong, where he is expected to make a conciliatory statement addressed to "all Chinese people."

6. Developments in South and Southeast Asia have been even more intriguing. Major movement in this area has focused on Burma. Ne Win has step by step fulfilled all Chinese "conditions" for improvement of relations between the two countries except for an unconditional public apology for the anti-Chinese riots of 1967, and has capped this pilgrimage to Canossa by dispatching an ambassador to Peking. Since taking office this autumn, Malaysian Premier Razak has made a number of conciliatory statements about the desirability of improving relations with China.

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India has discreetly explored the possibility of restoring diplomatic representation between the two countries to the ambassadorial level. The Philippines are apparently considering sending an "unofficial" trade delegation to China. Even the Thais have made some gestures toward Peking.

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Individual Thai ministers have sent personal emissaries to Peking to explore grounds for easing the present enmity between the two countries. Moreover, Foreign Minister Thanat has publicly expressed a desire for better relations with China. Of course, there is probably more smoke than fire in most of these gestures. The Indians and Thais, for example, can certainly have few illusions about the possibility of significant, early improvement of relations with China. The point is that each of these governments--and the Burmese as well--have felt it politic, and perhaps necessary, to make the gestures.

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7. The causes of this warming trend, and of the changes on the recognition and representation issues, are not hard to find. Some are, of course, rooted in the immediate needs and concerns of individual governments, but four in particular have a wider application. The first is the generalized feeling that China, a "nation of over 700 million people" possessing an atomic capability, should be and indeed is entitled to play a significant role in the world community; artificially to exclude her from such a role is dangerous. This line of reasoning applies primarily to those states considering recognition or desirous of China's admission into the UN. This is a familiar argument, but it is not for that reason simply a rationalization. Indeed, it would be very hard to overestimate its weight in present circumstances, for it not only influences governments themselves but is also persuasive to various pressure groups, particularly in Western Europe and Latin America, which in turn shape the environment in which governmental decisions are made. In fact, the sentiment that "China should be brought into the world community" has been in the process of crystallization for some time; the convulsions that accompanied the Cultural Revolution in China blunted the feeling briefly but apparently it did no permanent damage, and as a semblance of order and tranquility has returned to the mainland a wide variety of governments--the Burmese, the French, and the British, for example--have been quick to seize on signs of growing domestic stability as an indication that China was prepared to play a constructive role in world affairs.

8. A second factor is the familiar one that many want to climb on a bandwagon. Several states in Western Europe and to a lesser extent in Africa and Latin America believe that both the representation and recognition issues are on the verge of a considerable transformation, and none wants to be the last to "recognize realities." Luxembourg is a case in point: the government is afraid that it will soon

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be the only Benelux country that does not recognize Peking. Of course this sentiment makes the likelihood of a breakthrough on these issues that much greater. A third factor is the desire of a good many states to make common cause with Communist China in distancing themselves or fending off pressures from the superpowers--the United States or the Soviet Union or both. This factor is clearly operative in the policies of North Korea, North Vietnam, the east European states, and France. Finally, the countries of South and Southeast Asia are faced, as always, with the problem of dealing with their giant neighbor to the north. The possibility at least exists that the US presence in the area will decline in the foreseeable future, and in these circumstances the possibility of some modus vivendi with Peking is an obvious one to explore.

**Chinese Initiatives**

9. This general movement toward Peking is not taking place in a vacuum. In most, but not in all, cases there have been reciprocal moves on the part of China, and in some instances it has been the Chinese themselves who have taken the first step. Indeed, if states in Western Europe and elsewhere have exaggerated the degree of domestic stability the mainland regime has achieved, they have been accurate in noting that changes are underway in Communist China's foreign policies. Some of these changes are obvious; some are more subtle. In the first instance they seem designed to clear away the accumulated debris of past failures in Peking's foreign affairs, to put a new face on things. In this respect they frequently involve more a change in style than a mutation in the substance of policy. With certain notable and significant exceptions Peking is smiling at the world. Indeed, this can literally be said to be true. Mao Tse-tung's affability to foreign diplomats on the reviewing stand during the 1970 May Day parade set the foreign colony in Peking abuzz and caused raised eyebrows in chanceries around the world.

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10. From the Chinese point of view, the first important step in creating a new international image has been to end the isolation, largely self-imposed, in which China found itself at the end of the Cultural Revolution. At the height of the "revolution" all but one of Peking's ambassadors stationed abroad were recalled and nearly all embassies largely denuded of lesser staff members. In the early summer of 1969 diplomats began to return to the field. Some 28 ambassadors are now in place, and rumors circulating in Peking suggest that more will soon join them; junior diplomats are returning at a more rapid pace. Most of the emissaries being sent abroad are experienced diplomats with long tenure in the foreign ministry, and all have clearly been instructed to "circulate" and generally to appear amiable. Some have in fact engaged in fairly extensive conversations with such ostensible "enemies" as Americans or Indians--occurrences that would have been inconceivable a few years ago--as well as with a spectrum of nationals in the host countries to which they are accredited. In addition, an impressive number of Chinese delegations--economic, cultural, and political--have travelled abroad in the past year, while China has played host to numerous foreign delegations, particularly from North Korea, North Vietnam, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. A number of foreign political prisoners, particularly West European nationals, have recently been released in an obvious gesture of "good will."

11. This public posture has been complemented by the private remarks of Chinese officials

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In conversation the Chinese have stressed Peking's desire to have good relations with "everyone" and have taken pains to appear "reasonable" and flexible on foreign policy issues. Occasionally the Chinese desire to emphasize the "open door" approach has been carried to remarkable lengths. The recent visit of the British foreign office official was undertaken at London's

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initiative, but Chinese diplomats in Britain leaked to the press the suggestion that Peking had originally issued the invitation for the visit.

12. At the same time, Peking is pursuing an aspect of traditional, state-to-state diplomacy and economic aid on a scale greater than ever before. In addition to its major investment in the Tan-Zam railroad, China has since early summer extended aid to Pakistan, Sudan, Southern Yemen, and perhaps Congo (Brazzaville). These commitments amount to more than half of all economic aid China has extended to less developed countries during the past 15 years. Additional aid agreements have also recently been signed with North Korea and North Vietnam, and Peking has in passing also doled out small sums to Nepal, the Philippines, and Peru. The Peruvian and Philippine gestures, billed as earthquake relief and cyclone relief respectively, were made to countries with which China has no formal relations.

13. In keeping with this general approach, Chinese propaganda has for the most part been played in rather low key. Joint communiqués marking the visits of foreign delegations, for example, have usually stressed cooperation and mutuality of interest, rather than revolutionary rhetoric. This relatively low-key propaganda line has been particularly noticeable in connection with the Sino-Soviet dispute--recriminations against Moscow have been few and far between since the start of the talks in Peking--but other traditional whipping boys of the Chinese have also received relatively mild treatment in the past six months: India is a case in point. In particular, attacks on national leaders such as Mrs. Gandhi, Burma's Ne Win, and Philippine president Marcos have virtually ceased. Although there have been exceptions to this rule--statements regarding Japan, the Middle East and the Indochina war, particularly in the wake of the US incursion into Cambodia, have remained bellicose--

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it seems clear that Peking wishes to avoid brandishing its revolutionary sword in public too obstreperously.

First Things First

14. All of these actions are, of course, primarily an effort to improve atmospherics. But even this effort has its limits. China does not appear anxious to clear away the rubble of past, outworn policies all at once. There are obvious shadings in this approach; some matters and some areas clearly have priority over others. One high-priority item on the agenda is the campaign connected with China's seat in the UN; another area of obvious importance is the cementing of relations with the socialist states, both in Asia and in Eastern Europe. Improvement of relations with Western Europe also appears to rank relatively high on the list; relations with African and Middle Eastern states may be of lesser importance. Closer to home, however, Peking seems prepared to move with great deliberation.

15. The case of Burma is instructive in this regard. As relations have gradually improved in the past seven months, the Burmese have consistently shown themselves to be eager for rapprochement, and the Chinese have equally consistently expressed reserve--but not complete disinterest. This policy has wrung the maximum concessions from Ne Win: release of ethnic Chinese prisoners held by Burma, re-opening of trade with China at Burmese initiative, compensation of the victims of the anti-Chinese riots of 1967, and permission for the Chinese embassy to resume "cultural and organizational" activities among the Chinese population in Burma. These are four out of the five long-standing Chinese "demands" or pre-conditions for improvement of relations; and Ne Win has partially fulfilled the fifth--public apology for the riots--with a statement that could be construed as a back-handed apology. Nevertheless, Peking's eventual agreement to Burmese requests for an exchange of ambassadors was merely verbal, rather than

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written, and in fact the Chinese have not reciprocated Rangoon's dispatch of an ambassador to China. Nor have they given any sign that they would cease support for the Burmese Communist Party and other insurgent groups operating in Burma--Ne Win's cardinal aim in attempting rapprochement. The Chinese interest in all this was not only to extract from the Burmese whatever the traffic would bear but to make it crystal clear publicly that it was Rangoon that had moved toward China and not the reverse. Nevertheless, the Chinese have given something. Trade has been resumed, a new chargé of higher rank has arrived in Rangoon, and rumors are circulating that an ambassador will eventually be appointed.

16. This pattern is likely to be repeated at a still slower pace all along China's southern flank. Tun Razak's public statements have not required a Chinese reply, and none has been forthcoming. Indian and Indonesian probes, which may well have been half-hearted in any event, have been fended off--both were apparently told "the time is not ripe"--but not rejected out of hand. Thai gestures also require no reply, and movement in this area, if any, obviously depends on developments in Indochina. Indeed, this cautious approach has been used even further afield. Ethiopian overtures to the Chinese were initially parried, but after a hesitation of three months Chinese diplomats in Khartoum were instructed to begin negotiations leading to recognition. Peking clearly kept this particular card "in reserve," to be played when advantageous to keep up momentum on the recognition question.

17. This cautious, fairly tough, but pragmatic and flexible line obviously costs Peking little and is generally in keeping with the more open, "reasonable" image the Chinese are attempting to create for themselves. Elsewhere in Asia, however, pragmatism has led in a somewhat different direction. Peking believes there is little chance the policies of the Japanese governments vis-a-vis China will change in

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the immediate future, and acting on this assumption the Chinese are conducting a propaganda campaign of vilification against the Sato government. China may hope that this campaign will marginally influence governments and peoples in Southeast Asia that are suspicious of Japanese motives and fearful of future Japanese expansionism. More to its purpose, however, Peking is clearly attempting to exploit such suspicions and fears closer to home--specifically in North Korea. Indeed, the show of "solidarity" both countries have displayed in the past year has been largely constructed on an anti-Japanese--and anti-US--platform. Much the same is true with respect to Indochina. Here Chinese "revolutionary" militance, particularly in the wake of the US incursion into Cambodia, has emphasized common ground with North Vietnam. In both cases the gains have been immediate and real, and the costs have been minimal.

18. It should be recognized, however, that Peking is attempting to wean both Hanoi and Pyongyang further from the Soviet Union and to draw them closer to China. Insofar as this is possible, this aim has already been achieved; it is unlikely that the Chinese believe that either North Korea or North Vietnam is contemplating putting all its eggs in the Chinese basket. Thus, in both cases this "hard-line" approach is unlikely to produce further significant gains. Peking may well recognize this fact and may be tailoring its propaganda accordingly. The volume of Chinese propaganda on the Indochina situation has dropped considerably in recent weeks; references to an Asian "anti-imperialist front"--a North Korean invention apparently adopted by Peking at Pyongyang's behest--have also become infrequent. This is not to say that China is becoming dovish on these issues, particularly the Indochina war, but merely that these militant themes are no longer so prominent in the picture Peking paints of the world. Indeed, there have always been light streaks in this somber picture. Trade with Japan has not been hampered by China's verbal posturing, and Japanese businessmen have had little difficulty circumventing Chou En-lai's

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"threat" of last spring that firms trading with Taiwan could not trade with China. Moreover, statements by Chinese leaders suggest that Peking is far from willing to underwrite any North Korean "adventurism."

Policy Changes

19. In many respects this rather mixed approach to the world--emphasis on bilateral relations with many nations, a cautious, tough but not wholly unreasonable attitude toward outstanding differences with certain other states, militancy in areas where there is little prospect of accommodation--resembles Chinese foreign policy in the period preceding the Cultural Revolution. But the differences are even more striking than the similarities. The present shadowy "Asian anti-imperialist front" is a far cry from the "Peking-Pyongyang-Phnom Penh-Djakarta axis." Revolution in Africa and Latin America is in the back rather than the front seat. The dog fights with the Soviet Union in Communist front organizations have ceased. Accommodation has been mooted with a much wider range of nations, and the focus of this activity appears to have shifted to Europe from the third world. No attempt is being made to build a separate, exclusive UN of "anti-imperialist, progressive" states. In short, China no longer is trying to lead a "revolutionary," doctrinally pure world of its own, but seems bent on playing a part in the world as it exists.

20. In pursuing this end Peking has introduced into the mix of its foreign policies a number of specific changes quite separate from the general effort to improve atmospherics. The most obvious of these changes relates to its new attitude toward the UN. China now seems intent on assuming its "rightful place" in that body. The campaign to secure this place is being led by third parties--Algeria, Yugoslavia, and Romania--but it has been orchestrated from Peking. The Chinese have let it be known that they "really" want to enter the world body; they have also discreetly made it clear that the "preconditions" for

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UN entry enunciated by then foreign minister Chen I in 1965--revocation of the Korean War declarations condemning China, abolition of the UN Korean commission, changes in the UN structure and the like--no longer apply. Expulsion of the Nationalist Chinese remains the sole condition for entry. Chinese interest in the UN issue has been expressed in a variety of concrete ways. For example, the Chinese chargé in London very recently informed foreign office officials that in his "personal opinion" a negative British vote on the Important Question issue, coupled with a declaration on the Taiwan question paralleling the Canadian and Italian recognition formula (which is in itself a major retreat from the Chinese position taken at the start of negotiations with Ottawa and Rome in 1967) would permit diplomatic relations with London to be raised to the ambassadorial level--even if Britain failed to comply with long-standing Chinese demands to close its consulate on Taiwan.

21. A second area of change concerns China's relations with the Marxist-Leninist splinter parties that sprang up around the world when the Sino-Soviet dispute surfaced. These squabbling, ineffective and often unreliable groups, particularly those in Western Europe and Latin America, are now being very largely written off by Peking.

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it has not renewed its abortive attempt to capture international Communist front organizations from the Soviet Union. For the most part this new policy is merely a cutting of losses. The attempt to establish Peking as the fourth Rome was quixotic at best; moreover, the "Marxist-Leninist" groups in Western Europe were frequently an embarrassment to Peking. But more importantly, the effort to draw a sharp international organizational line between Moscow and Peking led to

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unnecessary difficulties with the socialist states of Eastern Europe as well as with Hanoi and Pyongyang.

22. A third area of movement and change is much more shadowy. This relates to the Chinese attitude toward possible negotiations in Laos. Peking has made no public statement regarding the Pathet Lao offer of talks with Prince Souvanna Phouma, but in private discussions with both Western diplomats and Laotians in Vientiane Chinese officials have indicated that Peking not only does not oppose such talks but actively looks with favor on them. This, of course, is a far cry from the signs of public pique China displayed when the Paris talks first began. This change of front may mean nothing more than that the Chinese are at this point more certain of attitudes and motives in Hanoi than they were in the summer of 1968, but it does raise questions regarding Peking's apparent commitment to the idea of "protracted war." For that matter, even the more bellicose Chinese statements on the subject of the war could be motivated by considerations apart from a simple desire to keep the fighting going. For example, Chinese verbal militancy at the time of the Cambodian incursion may have been more related to tactics, that is, the problem of cementing relations with Hanoi, than with strategy, that is, the Chinese reading of the overall situation in Indochina and in Southeast Asia in general.

23. Of course, even taken together these changes cannot be considered a radical reordering of Chinese foreign policy. They do, however, represent a significant change of emphasis. They are, moreover, substantive changes, something more than a welcoming smile. Nevertheless, it might be noted that each of these changes has been made quietly: none has required a public statement by the Chinese--or indeed any major new commitment on their part. Thus, should present policies fail or be abandoned, Peking can easily retreat without much loss of face. And perhaps equally important, Moscow would find it difficult to

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accuse the "anti-revisionists" of practicing a form of revision themselves.

**Peking's Motives**

24. This sensitivity to the Soviet factor points to a major motive force in the shaping of current Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, the whole problem of relations with the Soviet Union appears to lie very near the center of Chinese thinking on questions of foreign policy at present. In this respect the clashes on the Ussuri River in the spring of 1969 may have been something of a catalyst. They served to draw the attention of Chinese leaders in Peking from strictly domestic concerns to wider issues of foreign policy. The situation they confronted was not a reassuring one. Not only was China militarily inferior to the Soviet Union, but it was also diplomatically isolated, partly as the result of the failure of the policies of the early 1960s and more importantly as a result of intense preoccupation with internal convulsions. It was clear by the summer of 1969 that Moscow hoped not only to prolong that isolation but if possible to deepen it through such devices as Brezhnev's proposal for an "Asian collective security pact." The Chinese had set themselves the task of frustrating this aim.

25. Thus, the Chinese return to the international arena is designed, in the first instance, to counter Soviet attempts to perpetuate and if possible increase the self-imposed diplomatic isolation into which China had drifted during the Cultural Revolution. This relative isolation in itself made China vulnerable to Soviet pressures, and its termination was obviously to Peking's advantage. But in addition, more extensive and closer contacts abroad have probably allowed Peking to gain greater insight into Soviet intentions by assessing the views of third parties, while at the same time they have given China a wider forum in which to present its own case.

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26. In most respects, then, Chinese policy is essentially defensive. In Africa and perhaps in Latin America Peking hopes to provide a counterweight to current or potential Soviet influence, and where possible to circumscribe it. In Western Europe the idea is to "build bridges," to gain a degree of leverage, and to demonstrate that China, as a great power, cannot be isolated. In South and Southeast Asia circumstances dictate a waiting game, but a diminution of Soviet influence and leverage in such countries as India is obviously a long-term goal. In Eastern Europe and the Middle East, however, Chinese policy, while strategically defensive, is tactically offensive. By cementing ties to the East European states Peking can demonstrate that Moscow cannot afford to concentrate on pressuring China while ignoring developments in its own back yard. The obvious mutuality of interest that exists between China and certain of the East European states, particularly Romania and Yugoslavia, however, has in turn dictated some of the terms under which the duel with the Soviet Union is being conducted--at least insofar as cosmetics are concerned. Thus, the dramatic downplaying of polemics since the start of the Peking talks makes it easier for the East European states--and for North Korea and North Vietnam--to seek common ground with Peking, since they are not being forced to choose one side or the other; as noted above, this factor was probably decisive in China's decision to set the Marxist-Leninist splinter "parties" adrift.

27. In the Middle East Peking's aims are even more transparent: to cause trouble for the Soviet Union (and secondarily for the United States) by outflanking Moscow on the left. In this area, as in Eastern Europe, the Soviets are, from Peking's point of view, a status quo power. This fact has dictated China's tactics, which have been to play on the fears of the fedayeen and the more radical Arab states that the Soviets might sell them out in the interests of accommodation with the US. This has required a

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hard propaganda line more reminiscent of Peking's fulminations against Japan and the Indochina war than the gentler approach used elsewhere, but in practice this hard line costs China little, since it is essentially an onlooker in the Middle East. Indeed, Chinese motives and tactics in this area are sometimes very graphically illustrated: at the moment when Soviet diplomats were attempting to persuade Syria to accept the US-sponsored cease-fire early this autumn, Peking suddenly dispatched a delegation to Damascus, presumably to "buck up" the faltering Syrians.

28. The most dramatic event in this gradual process of reducing China's isolation, however, was the resumption of the Warsaw talks with the US last January. Although the Chinese were almost certainly interested in obtaining a reading on what the Nixon doctrine, with its implications for both Southeast Asia and Taiwan, would mean in practice, Peking's overriding concern in resuming the talks was unquestionably the effect that a renewal of the dialogue might have on the triangular relationship between Moscow, Peking, and Washington. The Chinese hoped that the Warsaw dialogues would heighten Moscow's nervousness and suspicion over the prospects of a China-US rapprochement, while, by appearing to hold out an olive branch, diminishing any desire in Washington to "gang up" with Moscow against China. Indeed, the idea of an understanding between the two "superpowers" regarding China seems very real in Peking, if not elsewhere, and in fact some aspects of the relationship between the two--such as SALT--could be read as confirmation of Chinese fears. Nevertheless, the US incursion into Cambodia made it imperative, from the Chinese point of view, to suspend the highly visible talks--but not to break them off entirely. In fact, the immediate aftermath of the Cambodia operation produced a situation in which the Chinese saw the possibility of early and real gains, in terms of cementing relations with Hanoi and Pyongyang in an anti-American atmosphere,

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at the expense of longer term and more problematic gains inherent in the Warsaw dialogue.

29. It has been, however, precisely since the suspension of the Warsaw talks that Peking has made the most rapid strides in improving its relations with other countries, not only with its Asian Communist neighbors but also in Europe. The oppressive sense of isolation obvious in Peking at the beginning of the year has consequently faded; and at the same time acrimony between Washington and Moscow has appeared to increase, primarily over the Middle East problem, but also over a number of lesser issues. As a result a resumption of the talks probably has a lesser priority in Chinese eyes than it had last spring, when the discussions were suspended. If it were possible, the Chinese leaders would probably prefer to keep both of the superpowers at arms length. Peking may therefore believe that it would be better to allow the talks in Warsaw to remain on ice while it pursues and consolidates further gains in Europe, Africa, and Latin America, thus placing China in a more advantageous position when the dialogue is resumed. Nevertheless, the strategic situation in which Peking finds itself vis-a-vis Moscow on the one hand and Washington on the other has not essentially changed, and the logic that led China to resume the talks in January is as valid as ever. Indeed, if it were to appear that Moscow could step up pressure on Peking as a result of easing tensions with the US in the Middle East or through progress in SALT, the Chinese would probably be quite anxious to resume the Warsaw discussions.

#### The Middle Kingdom

30. If the Soviet problem remains at the center of Chinese foreign policy thinking, this need not mean that Peking does not see other benefits in pushing forward with its current "open door" campaign. As time goes on, these additional benefits may prove to be an end in themselves. It is possible--even likely--that Peking has been somewhat startled by

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the range and depth of positive response to the relatively slight and frequently subtle changes in its foreign policy stance, but there can be no question that it sees in this response a means of asserting its long-standing claim to be a great power, with the privileges and prerogatives that go with this status. This cardinal aim of Chinese policy is of course of such importance to Peking that it hardly needs the goad of Soviet pressure to make it attractive.

31. In this respect the current movement on both the representation and recognition issues is mutually reinforcing. Canadian and Italian recognition helped achieve a favorable vote on the "Albanian" resolution in the UN; that vote will probably increase the chances that additional states would consider recognizing Peking. Given the number of states which are already considering this move, the Chinese probably can, if they are willing to settle for the recognition formula worked out with Rome and Ottawa, orchestrate and therefore reinforce the trend in this direction by maintaining a sense of momentum on the issue. This in turn, of course, makes a transformation of the representation issue in the UN that much more likely, while at the same time it enhances the "legitimacy" of the Peking regime at the expense of that on Taiwan.

32. In nurturing this trend Peking can be expected to press very hard to counter widespread sentiment for a "two Chinas" solution to the UN representation issue. Its recent public and private statements suggest that it is extremely sensitive on this matter and that it may fear that some states presently supporting the "Albanian" resolution will line up in the future behind a resolution calling for the seating of both Peking and Taipei. Indeed, not all nations favoring the admission of Peking to the UN necessarily wish to see Taipei expelled. A number of states now reconsidering their position on the representation issue would probably favor a resolution adopting the principle of "universality" put forward at the Lusaka non-aligned conference last summer

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(which in practice would mean the admission of all the divided states, Germany, Vietnam and Korea, as well as both Chinas, with Peking represented in the Security Council)--particularly if the United States moves in this direction. Others might prefer to vote on the "Albanian" resolution clause by clause, voting up the admission of Peking but voting down expulsion of Taipei.

33. But any "solution" along these lines depends on the attitude of the two Chinese parties and, quite apart from Communist China's own adamant position on the question of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," there are few if any indications that the government in Taipei would accept the "humiliation" of remaining in the UN along with the mainland regime. Indeed, should such a "solution" be adopted in the United Nations, Chiang Kai-shek might find the situation so distasteful that he would simply withdraw from the world body, thus paving the way for Peking's entry on its own terms; this in any event appears to be Chiang Kai-shek's present position. Yet, even if an impasse should develop on the "two Chinas" question, the present log-jam would have been broken, and pressures for the admission of Peking on the simple terms of the "Albanian" resolution--but without the cushioning effect of the Important Question motion--would hardly be likely to abate for long. Furthermore, "two Chinas" sentiment exists primarily among those states which either abstained or voted against the "Albanian" resolution this year, and this fact may help Peking protect its present plurality on the issue. In fact, no matter how this issue is approached, the moment when Peking will replace Taipei in all the organs of the UN may well be only a year or two away--barring the unlikely event of a drastic change in the policies of the Nationalist Chinese government.

34. Quite apart from the representation question, however, the ongoing series of recognitions of the mainland regime is bound to weaken and erode the international position of the government in Taipei.

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There is not a great deal the Nationalist Chinese can do about this, except to ask the US to apply the maximum pressure on governments considering recognition of Peking. Given the present momentum in the direction of Peking, this probably would not be overly effective, even if it were attempted. Nevertheless, this situation is not necessarily wholly favorable to Peking. As the rather frozen situation of the past 20 years thaws out, international sentiment has grown--and is likely to continue to grow--for a formal "two Chinas" solution to the Taiwan problem. Such a "solution" is hardly in Peking's interest; the mainland regime is nearly as worried about the possibility of growth of the "Taiwan Independence Movement" as is the government in Taipei, and it is equally concerned about Japanese investment and interest in Taiwan. Nor does Peking appear to believe a "military solution" to the problem is possible; it is well aware that the US treaty with the Nationalists is still operative. In this sense, then, time is not necessarily on Peking's side.

35. Nevertheless, a "two Chinas" solution to the Taiwan issue is almost certain to founder on the opposition of the Nationalist government. This opposition is not likely to fade even if Peking enters the UN and additional governments recognize the mainland regime. Indeed, the Nationalists' claim to be the sole government of China provides the rationale by which the regime is able to maintain a monopoly of power on the island, and to relinquish that claim would be to invite the native Taiwanese to overturn or swamp the existing power structure. In this respect, like that of the UN representative issue, then, the Nationalist government is in effect an ally of Peking: its views on the "two Chinas" approach to the Taiwan problem are indistinguishable from those of the mainland regime. For this reason the Chinese Communists probably do not believe it is necessary to press at once for a "solution" of the Taiwan issue. If time is not on their side, it is not wholly against them; and it may therefore be

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possible to allow the situation to "ripen" further as international support for the Nationalists slowly erodes.

A New Bandung?

36. Although this may be a logical reading of the situation, it is nevertheless one fraught with dangers for Peking. From the mainland's point of view there are far too many imponderables involved: the US may apply great pressure on the Taipei government to acquiesce to some sort of "two Chinas" formula; Chiang Kai-shek is now in his eighties, and when he dies his successors might possibly move away from the adamant positions he has staked out; either the US or Japan might encourage the Taiwan Independence Movement even at the expense of the Nationalist government. In the UN overwhelming sentiment may develop for some kind of "two Chinas" formula, and the Nationalist government may not be so obliging as to withdraw at once. None of these possibilities can be entirely written off. Moreover, Peking's recent political gains in the international arena, while going a long way to forestall Soviet attempts to isolate Communist China, are by no means so spectacular that they neutralize the ever-present military threat from the north. Given these circumstances, it might seem fruitful deliberately to step up the pace of events, to stack the cards by making a series of highly visible conciliatory gestures that would "prove" Peking's reasonableness while further undercutting opposition to the mainland regime. In other words, it might be useful, from Peking's point of view, to revive the "Bandung era" of the mid-1950s.

37. Although such a course may superficially seem quite attractive, it is almost certainly not in the cards. A great deal of water has gone under the bridge in the past 13 years, and a return to "Bandung" at this juncture would mean wholesale abandonment of a wide range of positions that China has staked out in the interim. Moreover, "Bandung diplomacy" was in part made possible by the alliance

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with Moscow, which of course was still operative in the mid-1950s. The military protection the Soviets supplied at that time gave Peking much more room to maneuver than it has at present; in Mao Tse-tung's view China is now caught in a "nutcracker" between the Soviet Union and the US, and this makes the free-wheeling diplomacy of the "Bandung" period virtually impossible to duplicate. Indeed, it is all too obvious that a profession of amity to one and all--a hallmark of "Bandung diplomacy"--is simply a nonstarter while the threat from the north persists and the Indochina war drags on. Finally a full-fledged return to Bandung would imply at least a temporary end to Chinese support for "people's war." Although Peking has reduced the volume of its revolutionary rhetoric and continues to give relatively meager support to insurrectionary movements in Southeast Asia (apart of course from the Indochina war), much less in the Middle East or Africa, it has by no means abandoned such support entirely. In fact, the Chinese leaders probably view such aid as a means of keeping states on its southern border "honest"--either at present, in the case of Burma, or in the future, in the case of Thailand and perhaps Malaysia.

38. Indeed, as noted above, splashy public declarations of policy intent are precisely the sort of thing that Peking has avoided in the present diplomatic phase. This gives China a flexibility quite different from that of the Bandung era but perhaps just as useful: relations with individual states can be improved or cemented fairly quietly and at a pace suitable to Peking, allowing the Chinese to extract the maximum possible advantage from any given situation. This careful attention to pace is another hallmark of Chinese policy at present; it permits Peking to defer difficult and sticky problems in bilateral relations until an advantageous moment while pushing forward in situations where the pickings are fairly easy.

39. The sticky problems remain, however, not only because Peking hopes to deal with them when

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its leverage is greater, but also precisely because they are sticky. Such problems involve difficult choices, and these choices are probably the sort of thing the still unsettled leadership in Peking would prefer to avoid at present. What, for example, ought Peking to do if the Sato government in Japan shows signs of interest in exploring the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations? Should China discuss the border issue with India? Is it worthwhile exploring a settlement or easing of the Taiwan problem with the US? Above all, is any accommodation with the Soviet Union possible? Some of these questions may answer themselves if addressed, but as yet there is no sign that they have really been addressed in Peking. Indeed, as the debris of past policy failures are finally cleared away, as China's international position becomes more "legitimized" and it gains at least some of the trappings of a "great power" it has so long desired, Peking will probably be faced with a set of problems it has been able to ignore while the log-jam of the past persisted. In this respect, then, the more difficult decisions still lie ahead.

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